In this study, morphological analysis is used to develop a framework for proactively assessing the risk of a terrorist attack on the air transportation system. Morphological analysis, a first order method pioneered by Fritz Zwicky, is employed to exhaustively create possible attack scenarios. Morphological analysis is then used to assess the likelihood of each scenario. Given a consequence estimation method, the risk for each of these scenarios can be determined. A method for developing profiles of various terror organizations is outlined and, given this information, a more specific assessment of high-risk scenarios can be made. Using the method developed herein, defensive organizations would have the capability to quickly assess how risky various terrorist attack scenarios are, and therefore more effectively protect our air transportation systems from those who would attack it for their own political or ideological gain.
I. Introduction
HE Air Transportation System (ATS) is a vital part of modern life. It serves as major economic driver for the economy by generating employment, revenues, and leveraging the sustainability of adjacent sectors such as tourism and trade. 1, 2 It is also recognized for its societal impacts as it enhances quality of life, provides access to remote resources, and enables mobility as a key element in the modern way of life. 3, 4 Moreover, the ATS is recognized as part of the nation's critical infrastructure which, by definition, is so vital to overall stability that its disruption or destruction is expected to have a debilitating impact over a variety of dimensions such as security, public safety and economic stability. 5 Thus there is a strong incentive protect the system and support its continuing growth so that society as a whole can continue enjoying the benefits it provides.
For these very reasons the ATS is targeted by enemies seeking to cause as much damage, disruption, and losses as possible. In fact, commercial aviation "remains a preferred target for terrorists seeking high body counts" 6 or for those looking to reach the general population by exploiting the attention awarded by the media. There is a long history of commercial aviation terrorist attacks in the U.S. and around the world. 7 This history has consistently shown that air transportation threat management presents some formidable challenges given the system's sheer size, complexity, and geographic dispersion. Budgetary and logistic constraints further exacerbate the difficulty of this task, particularly in terms of the decision making process involved in the selection of a solution portfolio. Most importantly, lessons learned during each attack have not been enough to stop future ones. History reveals that immediate tactical response by authorities as well as strategic policy developments have been, and continue to be, inevitably reactive. Consequently, there is a strong incentive to shift to a more proactive paradigm in civil aviation security and risk management.
Some obvious research questions arise from these observations. What are some of the enabling techniques, methods, and tools of this paradigm shift? How can past experience be used as a starting point for creative extrapolation, rather than a limitation, to aviation security and threat management? How can expert opinion be used to identify risks and leverage the selection process of security measures?
The research presented this paper addresses these questions by proposing a morphological approach to risk assessment in the context of aviation security. The next section provides a brief background on risk management, followed by the methods and challenges of risk assessment in Section III. Section IV presents the desired features of a risk assessment method that enables a proactive paradigm, and Section V introduces the proposed approach by
II. Risk Management
When dealing with threats, vulnerabilities, and security capabilities, the concept of risk seems to surface in a natural way. Risk is generally defined as the combination of the likelihood of a given event and the consequence or associated outcome of that event if it occurs. Higher risk comes with a higher likelihood of occurrence or with a greater measure of consequence. Though the concept is intuitive, measuring, calculating, or otherwise determining adequate values of likelihood and consequence are not trivial tasks. The body of methods and techniques used to measure, or quantify, risk are commonly classified as risk assessment. 8, 9, 10 When risk has been characterized and evaluated the issue that naturally follows is the mitigation of that risk. There are many factors that come into play, such as the tradeoffs between cost of mitigation measurements and the amount of risk reduction, or the generation of new vulnerabilities and risk sources with the implementation of mitigation measures. Some sources denote this task as risk evaluation and consider it part of risk assessment because some entities decide to treat or to accept the risk at this point. Otherwise, the structured approaches that guide the selection of a solution portfolio are classified as risk mitigation, treatment, or reduction. Risk assessment and mitigation are the two primary elements in what is known as risk management. In recent years the concept has been extended to include opportunities as the result of event probability and their positive consequences, and has thus been renamed opportunity and risk management. 
III. Risk Assessment -Methods and Challenges
Risk assessment techniques are primarily involved with modeling risk and quantifying it by estimating appropriate values for risk parameters. Some approaches use qualitative scales to measure consequences and likelihood of occurrence and call upon the experience of subject matter experts to perform the assessment for a set of events of interest. In this case, risk is usually determined as a product of probability and a consequence scalar index, and identified within a risk-level matrix as shown notionally in Figure 1 . In this example event impact is categorized as low, medium, or high, with corresponding scalar values of 10, 50, and 100. Similarly, low, medium, and high likelihood events are modeled via probability values of 0.1, 0.5, and 1.0. Resulting values for high risk events have a score above 50, medium risk events have a score between 10 and 50, and low risk events have a score below 10. 
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Consequence estimation is very ambiguous and dependent on too many degrees of freedom for generic or notional events. Cost-based methods are equally plagued by assumptions and influencing factors that render attempts for quantification fairly ineffective. Thus a qualitative approach with basic numeric mappings leveraged by expert opinion is usually an attractive alternative given its simplicity and yield of widely acceptable estimates.
Likelihood estimation in risk assessment leverages on probability techniques and expert opinion. Events of interest are often modeled as chains of smaller events and conditions for which individual likelihood values are produced and used to determine an aggregate likelihood figure. These are particularly common in security 3 applications where the events are explained via external threats and internal system security capabilities, as notionally depicted in Figure 2 . There are some notable challenges in risk assessment. First, the determination of event consequence is usually limited to expert opinion via a qualitative scale. Moreover this expert assessment needs to take place for each singular risk identified, which eliminates the possibility of an analysis that handles a very large list of potential threat events. Secondly, the determination of event probability can be leveraged by mathematical models, but resolution and detail can be lost in its translation from the conceptual model where elements such as attacker motivation and capabilities can be implicitly captured. Third, breaking down the entire event probability into a series of smaller event probabilities may increase the complexity of the problem rather than reducing it. This could happen if, for example, the difficulty of estimating the probabilities of the smaller events within the conceptual event is comparably as high as that of estimating the probability of the entire event. Finally, in the specific case of commercial aviation the types of attack that have taken place are so varied that a single model may not fully capture all the different types of events.
IV. Features of a Proactive Risk Assessment Approach
To enable the shift to a proactive paradigm in risk management the new approach should be explorative, rather than normative. This should prevent analysts and policy makers from starting their analysis with preconceptions about potential attacks that neglect important parts of the event space. A related desirable attribute is that this method be exhaustive in its exploration of the event space so as to enable consideration of a wide variety of possibilities. Because so many possible events may be rendered in the analysis, some amount of embedded logic is desired as well so that events with very low or very high likelihood can be readily identified. Finally this approach must consider the present and potential future architecture of the ATS (within a relevant scope), and must also capitalize on historical data to guide the creation of event models by providing a starting point for extrapolation, rather than an inhibitor of creative thinking.
V. The Air Transportation System -An Operational Perspective
In order to study potential vulnerabilities of the ATS and rigorously explore the different forms in which it can be attacked it is first necessary to look at the system's architecture. In this study the ATS is observed exclusively from an operational perspective, which means that the scope of the analysis is limited to the elements of the critical infrastructure that are directly involved in the normal operability of air transport functions. For example, the department of Human Resources of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is a constituent of the critical infrastructure. However its role in the normal fulfillment of air transport operations is supportive or indirect, rather than direct. In contrast the control tower at an airport is directly involved in air transport functions and thus is considered within the operational scope at hand. The characterization of the ATS operational architecture requires that internal elements, functions, boundaries, and points of entry be appropriately identified. Different parts of the ATS feature varying levels of accessibility to users and staff, often within the same location. In this study the boundary of the system is defined as the outermost margin, characterized by the intentional control of accessibility, beyond which users and staff have total or partial access to system elements. Points of entry to the ATS are therefore, by definition, located on the system boundary.
The airport is one of the most critical operational elements of the ATS and thus serves a good starting point to illustrate these concepts. An operational diagram of a notional airport is shown in Figure 3 . The ATS boundary has been identified with the red dashed contour. When users enter an airport they are initially limited to an area referred to as the landside, hosting airport functions such as airline check-in counters, baggage claim belts, and retail shops. This area is open and unrestricted to the general public, and thus lies outside the ATS boundary. However, some of the aforementioned functions are critical to normal air transport operations and should therefore be considered a special case of ATS elements. The passenger security checkpoint is the primary access-control margin between the landside and the airside area, the latter restricted only to passengers, crew, and airport staff. The airside is composed of many of the services found in the landside (retail, airline desks, etc.) and additionally gives access to the gates and aircraft. The landside-airside security checkpoint is the first and outermost access-control margin for passengers and 4 airside staff who wish to access the ATS. It therefore represents part of the system boundary and a point of entry to the system. Both landside and airside conform what has been identified in this study as the user area of the airport. This term reflects the fact that this is the only part of the airport where passengers are free to move about. Access to all other areas of the airport is restricted to airport employees and authorized staff. The operational architecture of the ATS beyond a single airport is significant, but outside of the scope of this study. These elements include the Terminal RADAR Control facility (TRACON), the Air Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), and navigation facilities such as VORTAC stations among others. 
VI. A Morphological Approach for Risk Assessment

A. Fundamentals of Morphological Analysis
The approach proposed in this research makes use of Morphological Analysis (MA), an established field of study that is well suited for the aforementioned event spaces. MA was originally developed by Swiss-American astrophysicist Prof. Fritz Zwicky (1898 Zwicky ( -1974 in the mid 1960's while working at the California Institute of Technology. 11, 12 This approach is inherently explorative and exhaustive, satisfying two key features previously identified as critical enablers of the proactive paradigm shift. A morphological approach allows analysts to decompose potential attacks into key components, examine and identify the combinatorial rules between these components, and explore the event space in search of specific attacks, or families of attack modes, that may reveal vulnerabilities and therefore become of special interest. Basic MA has been improved upon in recent decades, mainly through computer supported implementations, and has been successfully used for scenario development, 13, 14 hazmat accident preparedness assessment, 15 sabotage and attacks to nuclear power infrastructure, 16,17 assessment of disasters and extraordinary societal events, 18 multi-hazard disaster reduction strategies, 19 and general socio-technical problems. 1 MA is divided into two major parts. The morphological field captures all the classes of elements in a system and lists all potential element alternatives under each class. A selection of element alternatives, one from each class, constitutes one system alternative. The cross-consistency matrix is a pair-wise comparison matrix that serves to capture relational information among element alternatives and identifies impossible combinations. In turn the total combinatorial space of possible system alternatives is reduced to a smaller subset featuring only those that are realizable, or internally consistent. A notional illustration of these artifacts is shown in Figure 4 . 
B. Attack Model and Morphological Field
The first step in the morphological study of possible ATS attacks is to define an attack model that features key elements. Based on these element classes different element alternatives can be identified to build the morphological field. Two nested attack models were created for this research based on a survey of numerous incident reports. The top-level model, shown in Figure 5 , features elements related to the security threat, the consequences of a successful attack, and the different security capabilities. In general, an attacker has a motivation to perform an attack so as to produce an impact on the ATS. Security capabilities include deterrence, which is traditionally formulated in strategic terms and seeks to reduce the incentive to perform the attack. It also includes intelligence and the tactical aspect of security whose purpose is to foil the attack before it takes place. Containment and recovery resources are deployed to mitigate the impact of the attack in the eventuality that it is actually performed. As will become evident in later sections, the scope of this research is directly supports the formulation/selection of tactical security measures and containment resources by identifying attack modes of interest. Though equally crucial to a robust security effort, strategic deterrence and intelligence lie beyond the current scope. At the lower level a tactical attack model describes how an attack on the ATS is conducted, identifying fundamental elements within a relational structure. The tactical attack model developed in this research, shown in Figure 6 , features an attacker who seeks to achieve a tactical objective on a target. The target refers to the parts of the ATS that will be primarily affected, such as aircraft or parts of an airport, whereas the tactical objective defines the specific impact or effect imparted by the attacker, such as seizing control or destroying the target. The attacker uses tools to enable the tactical objectives, namely weapons with which the tactical objective is enabled. These tools need to be moved by the attacker via a means of transportation and entered into the system through a point of entry. The elements of the tactical model were used as element classes for the morphological field, which was later populated based on information available in publicly available literature regarding past attacks and current security concerns. The final morphological field is presented in Figure 7 . As a validation exercise for the tactical attack model and the morphological field, a number of previous ATS attacks were considered. The results of this exercise, partially presented in Figure 8 , provided a measure of the extent and accuracy with which the proposed model can represent real (or notional) attacks on the ATS. It was determined that for the current research purposes the model sufficiently captures both the fundamental structure and key elements of an act of aggression against the ATS. Moreover, the apparent completeness of the morphological field strongly suggests that the model can produce a sufficiently vast combinatorial set of events, enabling a proactive perspective into the multiple potential attack forms. Two moderate limitations were identified during the validation exercise. First, the model captures attacks on the ATS but is unable to capture ulterior motives or higher level objectives by the attackers that extend beyond the operational scope previously identified. For example, it can be noted in Figure 8 that the 9/11 attacks show "seize control" of the "aircraft" as the Tactical Objective and Target respectively. In this instance the top level objective of attackers was to use the ATS, more specifically aircraft, to accomplish other goals. However, seizing control of the aircraft is considered a tactical objective within the scope of the ATS during the attacks. Second, the model can only address a single tactical objective at a time. As a result, multiple coordinated attacks can not be directly captured, but rather need to be decomposed into sub-chains of events within a larger coordinated aggression. Once divided into a set of smaller events, they can all be captured by the model and all the alternatives in the morphological field.
C. Likelihood Measurement and the Cross-Consistency Matrix
In this research the likelihood of a successful attack is characterized as a function of the aggressor's capability, existing security controls, and technical feasibility of the attack itself. As mentioned earlier, strategic considerations of deterrence that impact an aggressor's motivation to conduct an attack are not explicitly captured, and it is assumed that sufficient motivation to successfully conduct such an attack exists.
The likelihood of a successful attack as a function of security controls captures the ability of existing resources to detect a weapon being inserted into the system. Thus a pair-wise assessment of this likelihood is performed for the alternatives of Tool with respect to Point of Entry and Tool Transport elements, which capture that aspect of the attack attempt. For example, existing security measures such as metal detectors or backscatter X-ray machines 7 determine the likelihood of success in attempting to sneak a handgun (Tool) concealed under the perpetrator's clothes (Transport) through the passenger security point (Point of Entry). A [0, 1, 3, 9] scale is used where 0 represents perfect possibility of attack detection (null likelihood of attack success), 1 represents high likelihood of detection (marginal likelihood of success), and 9 is a marginal likelihood of attack detection (very high likelihood of attack success). This scale is primarily based on a ratio scale, which is commonly used for relative or comparative assessments for which absolute values are inconvenient or difficult to determine. The zero value has been added to incorporate the possibility of a null likelihood, rather than a marginal one, which also serves to identify incompatible or logically impossible combinations.
Similarly, the technical feasibility of the attack captures the effectiveness of an attack based on the Tool or weapon selected by the attacker with respect to the intended Target and Tactical Objective. For instance, the frequency of incidents during the 1970's and 1980's that featured use of handheld weapons (Tool) to seize control (Tactical Objective) of an aircraft (Target) represented a technical feasibility, and a likelihood of success, of interest for security authorities at that time. On the other hand, some combinations of attack model elements have, quite logically, low or null technical feasibility and likelihood of success, such as the use of biological weapons to destroy maintenance facilities. Likelihood of success as a function of technical feasibility is also assessed via pair-wise values in the cross-consistency matrix using the [0, 1, 3, 9] scale.
Based on the aforementioned formulation, the cross-consistency matrix was populated, thus capturing all pairwise values affecting the likelihood of success for all possible attacks, i.e. all attack element combinations. The morphological field in Figure 7 contains over 5000 possible attack scenarios. For each one of them the likelihood of success was generated via an aggregate likelihood index L TOTAL , shown in Equation 1, where L ij is the pair-wise likelihood value between the elements in the i th row and j th column of the cross-consistency matrix.
For the morphological field provided in Figure 7 , Equation 1 can be expanded to the form shown in Equation 2.
The resulting likelihood value for each attack scenario can then be used as a comparative parameter to rank it against all other scenarios. Such a ranked list identifies internally inconsistent attack combinations for which the likelihood index is zero, indicating that one or more pair-wise values were null. For the compatible subset the ranked list also features the most likely scenarios, as well as the most frequently appearing attack elements and element combinations.
D. Attacker Profiles
Terrorism, defined as "the act of terrorizing; use of force or threats to subjugate, especially such use as a political weapon or policy" 21 , is a relatively broad term. There is a multitude of parameters such as technical competence, monetary resources, ideological values, and organizational objectives, which can be used to describe and characterize the wide range of terrorist entities. Though a generalized and exhaustive approach to terrorism and national security research is a necessary basis, there is significant incentive to incorporate considerations that focus on specific groups most likely to attempt acts of aggression against the nation. The characteristics of these entities of interest provide a wealth of information regarding the type of attacks they are likely to attempt, and in turn provide an additional layer of information that empower decision makers and analysts in the task of allocating limited resources to security measures.
In order to capture the behavior of different potential attackers a series of notional terrorist profiles were created using four basic descriptors:
1. Funding and monetary assets 2. Technical capability 3. Fear of group or member loss during attack 4. Desire to use an innovative attack These descriptors can be mapped to elements of the morphological field and can be used to filter the ranked likelihood results for each scenario. For example, a terrorist entity modeled with a lack of technological expertise and very limited funding will have narrow access to certain types of weapons. Matching attacker profiles with filter settings over the event space yields the likelihood measure for all possible attacks with a given attacker in mind.
Because the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a methodology and the analytical capabilities it affords for ATS security, all profiles created are notional and intended for illustration purposes only. Three terrorist group profiles were created: an eco-terrorist group, a lone wolf anti-government group, and a state vs. state attacker. To develop the terrorist profiles for this illustration, public domain information, historical terrorist attacks, and Hollywood fiction were surveyed. The notional eco-terrorist group is based on the FBI's definition of eco-terrorism, namely, "the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally-oriented, subnational group for environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature."
22 Examples of eco-terrorism used to further build this profile were taken from Hollywood fiction such as 12 Monkeys 23 and Moonraker 24 , and historical events like the Aum Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995. The lone wolf anti-government terrorist was modeled after domestic terrorist attacks including the Timothy McVeigh Oklahoma City bombing of a US Government building in 1995. 25 The third profile was framed as a fictionalized version of the 2006 radioactive plutonium contamination of aircraft flying between London and Moscow. 26 This profile, though fictionalized, was also intended to capture potential espionage efforts by one state against another. For each group, and based on the details of the profiles developed, a qualitative mapping was performed for the four descriptor parameters, as shown in Figure 9 . Implementing these mappings as filters for the ranked list of scenario results the breadth of possible attacks favored by each group is readily revealed. 
Eco-Terrorist Attack
E. Consequence Estimation
Following the previous scheme used for likelihood assessment, the determination of consequence is approached using the morphological constructs and assigning indices to relevant elements. Consequence index values were chosen to be higher for attacks that target humans rather than material assets. Similarly, use of certain weapons, like biological agents, is assumed to have a bigger effect than conventional weapons. However, it was noted that this qualitative assessment of attack impact provided low resolution results in the ranking of the different scenarios relative to the more elaborate resolution in the likelihood rankings. Moreover, even a low resolution qualitative ranking of incident impact proved to be challenging in the context of ATS risk assessment. A key difficulty is rooted in the matter of perceived consequence, vis-à-vis monetized losses or other forms of consequence quantification. Consider for instance an attack on the communication and navigation assets of an airport that is rapidly contained and has only minimal effect on airport operations. Whereas this incident can be characterized to have marginal or null monetized losses, the perception of the general public will be one of significant consequence based on what could have occurred and on the vulnerabilities that are revealed by such an incident, even if the attack itself had no success.
Though assessments for both likelihood and consequence should be used in the formal definition of risk, the aforementioned observations strongly suggest that consequence quantification techniques must be matured to a level comparable to that of likelihood estimates before both can be concurrently used for ATS or other security studies. For this reason, all sample results presented in the next section are limited to notional likelihood assessments, and ignore consequence quantification.
VII. Sample Results and Discussion
As part of this research effort, sample results have been produced based on the notional constructs presented in the previous sections. The purpose of these results is to illustrate the implementation of the proposed methodology and demonstrate the analytical capabilities afforded by it in support of ATS risk assessment. However some important observations need to be presented at this point.
The top-level and the tactical attack models were formulated with enough generality so as to be applicable in a vast series of applications, and did not require the use of sensitive security information in their formulation. However, generating morphological constructs in a real-world security study, namely the population of the morphological field and the cross-consistency matrix, must involve security personnel and other subject matter experts. In particular, the pair-wise likelihood values constitute sensitive information associated with existing security resources as well as technical knowledge about potential weapons usage. Similarly, attacker profiles are associated with sensitive information regarding security intelligence about terrorist entities of interest.
Because the authors are not ATS security experts, and due to the obvious security sensitivity of the present subject matter, all the values and results hereby presented are purely notional and intended only for methodological demonstration and illustration purposes. Whereas the methodology and general implementation guidelines are intended to be followed and improved upon by the community at large, the specific results are exemplary in nature and do not, in any way, represent real-world security assessments of the ATS.
Based on the morphological field created by the authors a total of 5,040 attack scenarios were created. After applying the relational information within the cross-consistency matrix to generate aggregate likelihood values a subset of 1,172 internally compatible/consistent scenarios resulted. Figure 10 presents For the notional results generated, explosives are identified as a high-risk weapon. Similarly, transportation of weapons via ground vehicle or concealed within garments and carry-on luggage are observed to be of particular interest. Airport users are noted as highrisk targets relative to most airport assets. The distribution of tactical objectives would suggest that there is not a single particular area of focus, whereas points of entry would seem to be of progressively higher risk in areas more accessible, or closer to, passengers. Authorities can use this information to select security measures and allocate them accordingly through the airport based on available resources.
Data filters based on notional terrorist profiles were applied to the notional results and plotted in percentage distributions as shown in Figure 11 . In this plot the top 10% attack scenarios for each terrorist profile, as well as the unfiltered data, are presented side by side. This information shows that if authorities can profile the terrorist group they can further refine where they should focus security efforts and resources. For example, if defense against ecoterrorists was of particular national interest, their high-technology and well funded background increases the likelihood of exotic tools and weapons such as radiological, chemical, or biological. Alternatively, data filtering on lone wolf anti-government groups would reveal that their low-technology background translates to a very high likelihood of explosives usage (over 90% of top risk-weighted combinations), and that their lack of funding or technological background prohibit the use of exotic tools. The absence of concern of collateral loss modeled for notional eco-terrorist groups is observed in tendencies to conceal weapons, even exotic ones, within the attacker's clothes or body, not observed in other profiled entities. State-level enemies depict comparable access to sophisticated forms of attack but feature greater resilience in collateral damage.
Other notional trends for profile-filtered results reflect general conclusions of unfiltered data, such as the prevalence of airport users as a preferred target which correlates with preferences to access the system via the landside boundary or the main security point.
VIII. Summary and Concluding Remarks
Safekeeping the ATS and other critical infrastructures remains a national security priority. Shifting the current security paradigm from a reactive nature to a proactive and more predictive one is a key to meet this priority. The methodology proposed is an exhaustive and explorative approach that incorporates expert opinion and embeds it into the relational logic of morphological constructs. The use of top-level and tactical attack models provide general applicability and encompass a vast range of scenarios, while avoiding the need to resort to sensitive security information. In a real-world implementation of this method security experts would be queried to determine lower level measures of likelihood, so that aggregate likelihood figures can be generated and used as a ranking scheme to eliminate internally inconsistent scenarios and prioritize those representing higher risk levels.
Visualization of results is vital for the adequate assessment and evaluation of potential risk. Notional results from the morphological analysis were represented in histograms showing both the compatible and most likely scenario elements. Trends in relative frequency of attack model elements reveal security issues of interest that guide proactive and robust security resource allocation across a multitude of scenarios. The use of attacker profiles mapped to data filters enables the characterization and refinement of the generic attack data set, therefore allowing a defense approach tailored to entities of interest.
The proposed approach features small shortcomings in terms of modeling top-level attack objectives beyond the immediate tactical scope, and in terms of multiple coordinated attacks. However, more relevant gaps were identified in the quantification of event consequence, particularly due to the challenges of monetized loss estimation and the inherent complexities of perceived impact relative to alternative impact measurement schemes.
